

# Slides for Chapter 11: Security

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**Distributed Systems:**  
**Concepts and Design**

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## Figure 11.1

### Familiar names for the protagonists in security protocols

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Alice	First participant
Bob	Second participant
Carol	Participant in three- and four-party protocols
Dave	Participant in four-party protocols
Eve	Eavesdropper
Mallory	Malicious attacker
Sara	A server

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## Figure 11.2

### Cryptography notations

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$K_A$	Alice's secret key
$K_B$	Bob's secret key
$K_{AB}$	Secret key shared between Alice and Bob
$K_{Apriv}$	Alice's private key (known only to Alice)
$K_{Apub}$	Alice's public key (published by Alice for all to read)
$\{M\}_K$	Message $M$ encrypted with key $K$
$[M]_K$	Message $M$ signed with key $K$

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## Figure 11.3

### Alice's bank account certificate

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1. <i>Certificate type</i>	Account number
2. <i>Name:</i>	Alice
3. <i>Account:</i>	6262626
4. <i>Certifying authority:</i>	Bob's Bank
5. <i>Signature</i>	$\{Digest(field\ 2 + field\ 3)\}_{K_{Bpriv}}$

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## Figure 11.4

### Public-key certificate for Bob's Bank

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1. <i>Certificate type</i>	Public key
2. <i>Name:</i>	Bob's Bank
3. <i>Public key:</i>	$K_{Bpub}$
4. <i>Certifying authority:</i>	Fred – The Bankers Federation
5. <i>Signature</i>	$\{Digest(field\ 2 + field\ 3)\}_{K_{Fpriv}}$

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Figure 11.5  
Cipher block chaining





Figure 11.6  
Stream cipher



## Figure 11.7

### TEA encryption function

```
void encrypt(unsigned long k[], unsigned long text[]) {  
    unsigned long y = text[0], z = text[1];  
    unsigned long delta = 0x9e3779b9, sum = 0; int n;  
    for (n= 0; n < 32; n++) {  
        sum += delta;  
        y += ((z << 4) + k[0]) ^ (z+sum) ^ ((z >> 5) + k[1]);  
        z += ((y << 4) + k[2]) ^ (y+sum) ^ ((y >> 5) + k[3]);  
    }  
    text[0] = y; text[1] = z;  
}
```



## Figure 11.8

### TEA decryption function

```
void decrypt(unsigned long k[], unsigned long text[]) {  
    unsigned long y = text[0], z = text[1];  
    unsigned long delta = 0x9e3779b9, sum = delta << 5; int n;  
    for (n= 0; n < 32; n++) {  
        z -= ((y << 4) + k[2]) ^ (y + sum) ^ ((y >> 5) + k[3]);  
        y -= ((z << 4) + k[0]) ^ (z + sum) ^ ((z >> 5) + k[1]);  
        sum -= delta;  
    }  
    text[0] = y; text[1] = z;  
}
```

## Figure 11.9

### TEA in use

```
void tea(char mode, FILE *infile, FILE *outfile, unsigned long k[]) {  
    /* mode is 'e' for encrypt, 'd' for decrypt, k[] is the key. */  
    char ch, Text[8]; int i;  
    while(!feof(infile)) {  
        i = fread(Text, 1, 8, infile);          /* read 8 bytes from infile into Text */  
        if (i <= 0) break;  
        while (i < 8) { Text[i++] = ' '; }      /* pad last block with spaces */  
        switch (mode) {  
            case 'e':  
                encrypt(k, (unsigned long*) Text); break;  
            case 'd':  
                decrypt(k, (unsigned long*) Text); break;  
        }  
        fwrite(Text, 1, 8, outfile);            /* write 8 bytes from Text to outfile */  
    }  
}
```

## RSA Encryption - 1

To find a key pair  $e, d$ :

1. Choose two large prime numbers,  $P$  and  $Q$  (each greater than 10100), and form:

$$N = P \times Q$$

$$Z = (P-1) \times (Q-1)$$

2. For  $d$  choose any number that is relatively prime with  $Z$  (that is, such that  $d$  has no common factors with  $Z$ ).

We illustrate the computations involved using small integer values for  $P$  and  $Q$ :

$$P = 13, Q = 17 \rightarrow N = 221, Z = 192$$

$$d = 5$$

3. To find  $e$  solve the equation:

$$e \times d = 1 \bmod Z$$

That is,  $e \times d$  is the smallest element divisible by  $d$  in the series  $Z+1, 2Z+1, 3Z+1, \dots$

$$e \times d = 1 \bmod 192 = 1, 193, 385, \dots$$

385 is divisible by  $d$

$$e = 385/5 = 77$$

## RSA Encryption - 2

To encrypt text using the RSA method, the plaintext is divided into equal blocks of length  $k$  bits where  $2^k < N$  (that is, such that the numerical value of a block is always less than  $N$ ; in practical applications,  $k$  is usually in the range 512 to 1024).

$k = 7$ , since  $27 = 128$

The function for encrypting a single block of plaintext  $M$  is:

$$E'(e, N, M) = M^e \bmod N$$

for a message  $M$ , the ciphertext is  $M^{77} \bmod 221$

The function for decrypting a block of encrypted text  $c$  to produce the original plaintext block is:

$$D'(d, N, c) = c^d \bmod N$$

Rivest, Shamir and Adelman proved that  $E'$  and  $D'$  are mutual inverses

(that is,  $E'(D'(x)) = D'(E'(x)) = x$ ) for all values of  $P$  in the range  $0 \leq P \leq N$ .

The two parameters  $e, N$  can be regarded as a key for the encryption function, and similarly  $d, N$  represent a key for the decryption function.

So we can write  $K_e = \langle e, N \rangle$  and  $K_d = \langle d, N \rangle$ , and we get the encryption function:

$E(K_e, M) = \{M\}_K$  (the notation here indicating that the encrypted message can be decrypted only by the holder of the private key  $K_d$ ) and  $D(K_d, \{M\}_K) = M$ .

Figure 11.10  
Digital signatures with public keys





Figure 11.11  
Low-cost signatures with a shared secret key



## Figure 11.12

### X509 Certificate format

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<i>Subject</i>	Distinguished Name, Public Key
<i>Issuer</i>	Distinguished Name, Signature
<i>Period of validity</i>	Not Before Date, Not After Date
<i>Administrative information</i>	Version, Serial Number
<i>Extended Information</i>	.

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Figure 11.13  
Performance of symmetric encryption and secure digest algorithms

	<i>Key size/hash size (bits)</i>	<i>PRB optimized 90 MHz Pentium 1 (Mbytes/s)</i>	<i>Crypto++ 2.1 GHz Pentium 4 (Mbytes/s)</i>
TEA	128	—	23.801
DES	56	2.113	21.340
Triple-DES	112	0.775	9.848
IDEA	128	1.219	18.963
AES	128	—	61.010
AES	192	—	53.145
AES	256	—	48.229
MD5	128	17.025	216.674
SHA-1	160	—	67.977



## Figure 11.14

### The Needham–Schroeder secret-key authentication protocol

<i>Header</i>	<i>Message</i>	<i>Notes</i>
1. A→S:	$A, B, N_A$	A requests S to supply a key for communication with B.
2. S→A:	$\{N_A, B, K_{AB}, \{K_{AB}, A\}_{K_B}\}_{K_A}$	S returns a message encrypted in A's secret key, containing a newly generated key $K_{AB}$ and a 'ticket' encrypted in B's secret key. The nonce $N_A$ demonstrates that the message was sent in response to the preceding one. A believes that S sent the message because only S knows A's secret key.
3. A→B:	$\{K_{AB}, A\}_{K_B}$	A sends the 'ticket' to B.
4. B→A:	$\{N_B\}_{K_{AB}}$	B decrypts the ticket and uses the new key $K_{AB}$ to encrypt another nonce $N_B$ .
5. A→B:	$\{N_B - 1\}_{K_{AB}}$	A demonstrates to B that it was the sender of the previous message by returning an agreed transformation of $N_B$ .

Figure 11.15  
System architecture of Kerberos




Figure 11.16  
SSL protocol stack





Figure 11.17  
TLS handshake protocol



## Figure 11.18

### TLS handshake configuration options

<i>Component</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Example</i>
Key exchange method	the method to be used for exchange of a session key	RSA with public-key certificates
Cipher for data transfer	the block or stream cipher to be used for data	IDEA
Message digest function	for creating message authentication codes (MACs)	SHA-1

Figure 11.19  
TLS record protocol




Figure 11.20  
Use of RC4 stream cipher in IEEE 802.11 WEP

